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1
Liquidity Risk and Corporate Demand for Hedging and Insurance
Abstract: We analyze the demand for hedging and insurance by a corporation that
faces liquidity risk. Namely, we consider a firm that is solvent (i.e. exploits a technology
with positive expected net present value) but potentially illiquid (i.e. that may face
a borrowing constraint). As a result, the firm’s optimal liquidity management policy
consists in accumulating reserves up to some threshold and distribute dividends to its
shareholders whenever its reserves exceed this threshold.
We study how this liquidity management policy interacts with two types of risk: a
Brownian risk that can be hedged through a financial derivative, and a Poisson risk that
can be insured by an insurance contract. We derive individual demand functions for hedg-
ing and insurance by corporations. We show that there is a finite price above which both
demand functions are zero. Surprisingly we find that the patterns of insurance and hedg-
ing decisions as a function of liquidity are pole apart: cash poor firms should hedge
but not insure, whereas the opposite is true for cash rich firms. We also find
non monotonic effects of profitability and leverage. This may explain the mixed findings
of empirical studies on corporate demand for hedging and insurance: linear specifications
are bound to miss the impact of profitability and leverage on risk management decisions.
2
1 Introduction
Corporate risk management has been the subject of a large academic literature in the
last twenty years. This literature aims at filling the gap between the irrelevance results
derived from the benchmark of perfect capital markets (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) and
the practical importance of risk management decisions in modern corporations.
Several directions have been explored for explaining how and why firms should hedge
their risks:1
• managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1984),
• tax optimization (Smith and Stulz, 1985),
• cost of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985),
• cost of external financing (Stulz, 1990; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993).2
A few papers have applied these ideas to model corporate demand for insurance.3
The testable implications derived from these models are different, but there is now a
consensus among financial economists that profitability and leverage should be important
determinants of firms’ hedging and insurance policies. All of the above theories predict
indeed that more profitable firms should hedge less and that more leveraged firms should
hedge more. However this is not confirmed by the data. Indeed, although the empirical
literature (see for example Tufano 1996 and Geczy et al. 1997) typically finds that liquidity
is an important determinant of hedging (more liquid firms hedge less), leverage does not
seem to have a clear and robust impact on hedging decisions.
The main objective of this paper is to show that when liquidity management and risk
management decisions are endogenized simultaneously, the theoretical impact of prof-
itability and leverage is non monotonic: the firms that gain the most from actively man-
aging their risks are not the less profitable nor the most indebted. Moreover when insur-
ance decisions are explicitly modeled, we find that the optimal patterns of hedging and
insurance decisions by firms are exactly opposite: cash poor firms should hedge but not
insure, whereas the opposite is true for cash rich firms. Thus the relation between liquid-
ity, leverage and optimal risk management decisions of firms may be more complex than
1For a critical assessment of these ideas, see Smith and Stulz (1985).
2There are also theories based on performance evaluation (Breeden and Viswanathan, 1996; De Marzo
and Duffie, 1995), and the use of proprietary information by managers (De Marzo and Duffie, 1991).
However, these theories do not have simple implications on the impact of liquidity and leverage on
corporate risk management, the focus of this paper.
3See for example Mayers and Smith (1982), (1987) and (1990), or Caillaud et al. (2000).
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initially thought. This may explain the mixed findings of empirical studies on corporate
demand for hedging and insurance, who typically use linear specifications.
Our model uses a continuous time stationary framework la Merton (1974) or Leland
(1998), with the important difference that we focus on liquidity risk rather than solvency
risk. Namely, we consider a model similar to Radner and Shepp (1996) and Jeanblanc
and Shirayev (1995) where a firm operates a profitable technology but is confronted with
unpredictable4 liquidity shocks. In the benchmark model, the firm does not have access
to external financing. Thus, if its shareholders are cash constrained, the firm runs the
risk of being forced to liquidate if it makes operating losses. To mitigate this risk, the
optimal financial policy of the firm is to accumulate cash balances up to some target level
x∗ and distribute as dividends all further gains. As we explain below, x∗ can be viewed
as a measure of the cost of financial frictions.
After presenting a brief survey of empirical evidence on the relation between liquid-
ity, leverage and corporate risk management (Section 2), we recall the properties of the
benchmark model in Section 3. Then we study how the optimal financial policy of the
firm and the cost of financial frictions interact with hedging and insurance decisions. In
Section 4 we study hedging by introducing a Brownian risk that can be hedged by a
financial derivative. We show that the optimal value function can be characterized by a
system of variational inequalities (Theorem 1) then we exhibit the solution to this system
(Propositions 3 and 4). This allows us to measure the gain from hedging, as the reduc-
tion in the cost of financial frictions that is obtained through hedging. In Section 4 we
study insurance by introducing a Poisson risk than can be covered through an insurance
contract. Here also, we characterize the solution by a system of variational inequalities
(Theorem 3) that we solve explicitly (Propositions 6, 7 and 8). In Section 6 we introduce
the possibility of external financing and show that it decreases dramatically the gains from
hedging and insurance. Finally Section 7 derives testable implications on the impact of
profitability, risk and leverage on corporate hedging.
2 Liquidity, Leverage, and Corporate Risk Manage-
ment: Some Empirical Evidence
We will not review the enormous (and fast growing) empirical literature on corporate risk
management, but focus instead on the two factors we are interested in, namely liquidity
and leverage.5
4By contrast, in Merton (1978) and Leland (1998) the profitability of the firm is uncertain but cash
flows are predictable.
5We could not find any study on the impact of profitability on corporate risk management.
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Geczy et al. (1997) study a sample of 372 US firms, composed of the Fortune 500
largest firms that have at least one source of foreign exchange exposure. They use a
logit model to explore the determinants of the use of currency derivatives. They find no
statistically significant relationship between the decision to use currency derivatives and
capital structure, even when endogeneity of the latter is taken into account by using a
two-stage instrumental variable estimation technique. However they find evidence that
higher quick ratios, indicating more internally available funds, are associated with a lower
probability of using currency derivative instruments.
Tufano (1996) studies risk management behavior in the US gold mining industry. He
finds that managerial compensation (in the form of share ownership or stock options
holdings) is a major determinant of the use of derivatives: when managers own shares,
firms hedge more, but when managers own options, firms hedge less. They also find that
more liquid firms hedge less. However Tufano does not find a strong correlation between
leverage and hedging.
Using survey data, Hoyt and Khang (2000) study how the volume of insurance pre-
miums paid by corporations depend on their financial stucture. They find that leverage
(measured by the debt-equity ratio) is strongly significant (with a positive coefficient)
but surprisingly that the bankruptcy probability (measured by Altman’s Z value) is not.
Core (1997) studies the use of Directors and Officers liability insurance in Canada on
a sample of 222 firms for 1994. He finds, contrarily to Hoyt and Khang (2000), that
risk of financial distress is an important determinant of Directors and Officers insurance
purchase, but that leverage is not. This is confirmed by Boyer (2003) on a larger sample.
Finally, Haushalter (2000) examines the risk management activities of 100 oil and
gas producers for 1992 to 1994. When hedging is measured by a continuous variable, he
finds that leverage is strongly positively correlated with hedging. But when he studies
separately the decision to hedge and the extend of hedging, he finds that leverage is not
statistically significant in any of the probit regressions that look for the determinants of
the decision to hedge. However, among the firms who hedge, the extent of hedging is
positively correlated with leverage.
3 The Benchmark Model
We consider a firm that exploits a technology characterized by a cash generating process
following a drifted Brownian motion:
dXt = µdt+ σdWt, (1)
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where µ and σ are positive parameters,W is a standard Wiener process, and Xt represents
the amount of cash owned by the firm at date t. Shareholders are risk neutral and discount
the future at rate r.
We assume that the manager of the firm acts in the best interest of its shareholders
but that the firm does not have access to external finance. Shareholders cannot inject new
funds and the firm cannot issue new securities or borrow from a bank. Thus, whenever
Xt becomes negative, the firm is liquidated and the technology is lost forever.
6 In the
absence of liquidity constraints (i.e. if the shareholders had unlimited cash holdings)
the firm would continue forever,7 the shareholders injecting money whenever needed and,
symmetrically, collecting any cash surplus in the form of dividends. The NPV of a firm
starting with a level of cash x would be:
VFB(x) = x+ E
[∫ +∞
0
e−rtdXt
]
= x+
µ
r
, (2)
where the notation VFB stands for the “first best” value of the firm.
In fact this formula can be extended to negative values of x:
VFB(x) = max
(
0, x+
µ
r
)
, (3)
with the interpretation that unconstrained shareholders would be ready to pay out the
initial debt of the company up to the amount µ
r
, above which they exert their limited
liability option.
For the rest of the paper, we will consider the second best situation where the share-
holders of the firm have no cash,8 in which case the firm is liquidated wheneverXt becomes
negative. In that case it becomes optimal for shareholders to accumulate reserves up to
some level x∗ and to distribute dividends whenever Xt exceeds this level.9 The value of
the firm becomes:
V0(x) = E
[∫ τ0
0
e−rtd`t|x0 = x
]
, (4)
where τ0 represents the first time that Xt hits zero and d`t represents the local time
10
associated to Xt attaining the threshold x
∗. Hence, V0 can be found explicitly by solving
6These extreme assumptions are relaxed in Section 6.
7Contrarily to models such as Merton (1978) or Leland (1998) we focus on liquidity risk, and don’t
consider solvency risk.
8In the benchmark model, issuing debt or new equity is also impossible.
9See for example Radner and Shepp (1996), Jeanblanc and Shirayev (1995) or Milne and Robertson
(1996).
10The interpretation is that the optimal reserve is a diffusion reflected at x∗. The local time `t is the
process which ensures the reflection. We refer to Karatzas and Shreve (1991) section 3.6 for a rigourous
presentation of the notion of local time (see also the Appendix).
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the following boundary value problem:{
LV (x) = 0, 0 ≤ x ≤ x∗
V (0) = 0, V ′(x∗) = 1,
(5)
where LV represents the differential operator associated to (1), namely:
LV (x) = µV ′(x) +
1
2
σ2V ′′(x)− rV (x). (6)
The explicit value of V0 is given by
V0(x) =
eρ2x − eρ1x
ρ2eρ2x
∗ − ρ1eρ1x∗ , (7)
where ρ1 < 0 < ρ2 are the roots of the characteristic equation:
r − µρ− 1
2
σ2ρ2 = 0. (8)
The optimal value of x∗ is obtained by minimizing the denominator of V0 or equiva-
lently by solving V ′′0 (x
∗) = 0:
x∗ =
1
ρ2 − ρ1 ln
ρ21
ρ22
. (9)
A more compact way of characterizing the optimal value function V0 is):
∀x ≥ 0, max (LV0(x), 1− V ′0(x)) = 0. (10)
Like before, V0 can be extended to x < 0 by setting V0(x) = 0 (limited liability). All
these preliminary results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Jeanblanc and Shirayev, 1995) : In the benchmark model with cash con-
strained shareholders but no external risks, the value of the firm when it holds cash volume
x is:
V0(x) = max
(
0,
eρ2x − eρ1x
ρ2eρ2x
∗ − ρ1eρ1x∗
)
, (11)
where x∗ is given by formula (9).
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Figure 1: No external risk: The value V0(x) of the cash
constrained firm compared with
the first best value VFB(x).
V0(x) can be extended above x
∗ by setting, for x ≥ x∗:
V0(x) = x− x∗ + V (x∗), (12)
with the interpretation that, if the firm starts with cash reserves x above x∗, the amount
(x − x∗) is immediately distributed as dividends. Therefore, for x large enough, the
difference VFB(x)−V (x), which measures the cost of financial frictions, is constant. Since
V ′0(x
∗) = 1 and V ′′0 (x
∗) = 0, equation (5) implies that
V0(x
∗) =
µ
r
, (13)
which means that the cost of financial frictions (VFB(x) − V0(x)) is equal11 to x∗, when
x ≥ x∗.
What is noticeable about Figure 1 is that V0 is convex (and not differentiable) at 0 but
concave for 0 < x < x∗, and linear above x∗. This comes from the interaction between
the limited liability option (which generates the convex kink at zero) and liquidation costs
(which generate the strict concavity of V in [0, x∗)). This pattern will reveal crucial in
the sequel.
It is also interesting to look at the comparative statics properties of the cost x∗ of
financial frictions. Proposition 2 summarizes these properties:
Proposition 2 : The cost of financial frictions x∗ is a single peaked function of µ, and
an increasing function of σ2.
11Since (VFB − V0) decreases in x, x∗ underestimates the cost of financial frictions for x < x∗.
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Proof of Proposition 2: See the appendix.
The following figures represent the cost of financial frictions x∗ as a function of µ and
σ2. Notice that x∗ is bounded above by µ
r
.
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Figure 2: The cost of financial frictions
as a function of µ and σ2.
Maybe the most striking of these properties is the non-monotonicity of x∗ with respect
to µ, which measures the profitability of the firm. Highly profitable firms are not really
affected by financial frictions because their probability of financial distress is small. Con-
versely, barely profitable firms have little to lose from failure. It is the intermediate firms
that are hurt the most by the risk of failure. The same is true for leverage. Suppose that
the firm has to pay a constant coupon flow12 c, our formulas are immediately adapted by
replacing µ by µ− c. Figure 2 then implies a non monotonic influence of c on the cost x∗
of financial frictions. The case of the leveraged firm is analyzed in more detail in Section
5.
4 Hedging
We now introduce a first form of external risk, by assuming that the “operating” cash
flow process given by (1) is perturbed by a second Brownian motion of volatility σR (and
zero drift) that can be hedged through a financial derivative. This “external” risk can be
interpreted as foreign exchange risk or commodity price risk, the corresponding hedging
instruments being currency futures or commodity futures.
12As in Leland (1998), we assume that coupon payments are constant over time to maintain stationarity
of the financial structure.
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Equation (1) becomes
dXt = µdt+ σdWt + σRdW
R
t , (14)
when the external risk is not hedged (h = 0) and
dXt =
(
µ− 1
2
piσ2R
)
dt+ σdWt, (15)
when the external risk is hedged13 (h = 1). pi ≥ 0 is interpreted as the risk premium or
loading factor (cost of hedging per unit of variance) that remunerates the sellers of the
futures contract for the risk they take. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the
two Brownian motions W and WR are independent.
14 Let us introduce the differential
operators associated to h = 0, 1:
L(0)V (x) = µV ′(x) +
1
2
(σ2 + σ2R)V
′′(x)− rV (x), (16)
and
L(1)V (x) =
(
µ− 1
2
piσ2R
)
V ′(x) +
1
2
σ2V ′′(x)− rV (x). (17)
The optimal value function is obtained by finding the adapted process (ht, Zt) (where
ht ∈ {0, 1} represents the hedging decision at date t and Zt is the cumulative amount
of dividends distributed up to date t, a non-negative, non-decreasing15 right continuous
process) that maximizes the expected discounted value of dividends up to liquidation
(which occurs at τ , the first time where Xt hits 0). Formally
V (x) = max
h,Z
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtdZt|x0 = x
]
. (18)
This is a mixed singular/regular control problem of the type studied by Fleming and
Soner (1993), who prove the following result:
Theorem 1 (Fleming and Soner, 1993): If the value function V defined by (18) is C2,
it satisfies the following variational inequalities:
∀x > 0 max (L(0)V (x), L(1)V (x), 1− V ′(x)) = 0, (19)
together with the initial condition:
V (0) = 0. (20)
13In Section 5 we consider the possibility of partial hedging (h ∈ [0, 1]).
14An alternative, but equivalent, formulation is to consider that the hedging instrument is imperfectly
correlated with W . Perfect hedging corresponds to the limit case of perfect correlation (σ = 0 in our
model).
15The condition that Zt be non-decreasing corresponds to the assumption that shareholders are cash
constrained (non negative dividends). Without this restriction the first best could be attained.
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Nevertheless, solving the conditions (19), (20) does not always guarantee the optimality
of the solution, since we do not know a priori if this solution is unique. We succeed in
our case by constructing a concave solution of (19), (20) and by proving the following
verification theorem.
Theorem 2 Assume there exist a twice continuously differentiable concave function W
and a constant x1 such that
∀x ≤ x1 max (L(0)W (x), L(1)W (x)) = 0 and W ′(x) ≥ 1, (21)
∀x ≥ x1 W ′(x) = 1 and max (L(0)W (x),W (1)V (x)) ≤ 0 (22)
together with the initial conditions:
W (0) = 0 and W
′
(0) < +∞ (23)
then W = V . Furthermore, let h∗ be the measurable function defined by
h∗(x) = 1 {L(1)W (x)≥L(0)W (x)}
and Lt(x1) the local time at the level x1 of the diffusion process
dXt = (µ− σ
2
R
2
pih∗(Xt))dt+ σdWt + σR(1− h∗(Xt))dWRt ,
then W (x) = E
∫ τ0
0
e−rsdLs(x1), where
τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt ≤ 0}.
Proof: See the appendix.
We are now going to characterize V by constructing a solution to (19), (20) that has
the same shape as V0 (see Section 2), i.e. has a convex kink at 0, is concave for x positive
but smaller than some threshold x1 (the target level of cash reserves) and linear for x
above x1. In particular this shape implies that, when pi > 0, hedging is never optimal for
x sufficiently close to x1. Indeed:
L(1)V (x)− L(0)V (x) = −1
2
σ2R [piV
′(x) + V ′′(x)] ,
which is negative at x1 (since V
′(x1) = 1 and V ′′(x1) = 0) and thus, by continuity, for
x close to x1. In fact we establish below the existence of a second threshold x0 ∈ [0, x1]
such that the optimal hedging decision is given by:
h∗(x) = 1 if 0 ≤ x < x0 (24)
= 0 if x0 ≤ x ≤ x1. (25)
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The limit case x0 = 0 corresponds to no hedging at all.
Here also, the value function V can be obtained explicitly by finding a C2 solution to
the following free boundary problem:
L(1)V (x) = 0 0 < x < x0,
L(0)V (x) = 0 x0 < x < x1,
V (0) = 0, V ′(x1) = 1, V ′′(x1) = 0.
We need to introduce some notation. Let us denote by θ1 < 0 < θ2 the roots of the
characteristic equation corresponding to h = 1 (hedging):(
µ− 1
2
piσ2R
)
θ +
1
2
σ2θ2 = r, (26)
and by γ1 < 0 < γ2 the roots of the characteristic equation corresponding to h = 0 (no
hedging):
µγ +
1
2
(σ2 + σ2R)γ
2 = r. (27)
Proposition 3 : The value of the firm corresponding to the optimal hedging problem is
characterized by two regimes:
• 0 ≤ x ≤ x0 (hedging regime):
V (x) = A
[
eθ2x − eθ1x] , (28)
• x0 ≤ x ≤ x1 (no-hedging, or self insurance regime):
V (x) = Beγ1x + Ceγ2x, (29)
where A, B, C are positive constants.
proof: See the appendix.
Interestingly, the pattern derived in Proposition 3 is confirmed by empirical evidence:
both Tufano (1996) and Geczy et al. (1997) find that lower liquidity (measured by a low
quick ratio) is a significant determinant of hedging.
The five parameters characterizing V (namely x0, x1, A,B,C) are obtained by using
the five boundary conditions:
• V, V ′ and V ′′ are continuous at x0,
• V ′(x1) = 1, V ′′(x1) = 0.
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In particular we can easily determine the values of x0 and x1:
Proposition 4 : When pi ≤ 2µ
σ2+σ2R
, the hedging and dividend thresholds are given by
x0 =
1
θ2 − θ1 ln
θ1(θ1 + pi)
θ2(θ2 + pi)
, (30)
x1 = x0 +
1
γ2 − γ1 ln
γ1(γ2 + pi)
γ2(γ1 + pi)
. (31)
Proof: See the appendix.
Two limit cases are interesting:
• When pi = 0 (costless heldging), x1 = x0 = 1θ2−θ1 ln
(
θ1
θ2
)2
, which coincides in
this case with the dividend threshold x∗ of Section 3 (where σR = 0). This just
means that when hedging is costless, the firm always hedges and we are back to the
benchmark model with no external risk.
• When pi ≥ 2µ
σ2+σ2R
, x0 = 0: Thus there is a maximum price of hedging above which
the firm stops buying any hedging. This maximum price increases with the expected
profitability of the firm (µ) and decreases with the volatility of the unhedged cash
flow (
√
σ2 + σ2R).
The properties of the optimal hedging pattern are represented in the following figure.
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The next figure represents the gains from hedging.
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Figure 4 shows the value V (x) of the firm that hedges optimally (i.e. whenever x ≤ x0).
This value V (x) is in between the first best value VFB(x) and the value V0(x) of the firm
who never hedges. Notice that the hedged firm distributes more dividends. The gains
from hedging are represented by the difference G = x∗NH − x1 between the cost x∗NH
of financial frictions without hedging
(
x∗NH =
1
γ2−γ1 ln
γ21
γ22
)
, and the cost x1 of financial
frictions with optimal hedging. As we have already noticed, this difference vanishes when
pi ≥ 2µ
σ2+σ2R
.
Using formulas (30) and (31), we can derive the expression of these gains from hedging,
which we denote by G:
G =
1
γ2 − γ1 ln
γ21
γ22
− x1
=
1
γ2 − γ1 ln
γ1(γ1 + pi)
γ2(γ2 + pi)
− 1
θ2 − θ1 ln
θ1(θ1 + pi)
θ2(θ2 + pi)
, (32)
where θ1, θ2 and γ1, γ2 are defined respectively by (26) and (27). The comparative statics
properties of G are complicated, since in particular θ1 and θ2 are implicit functions of the
loading factor pi. However, since the markets for financial derivatives are in general highly
competitive, we can reasonably assume that pi is close to zero, in which case G converges
to:
G0 =
1
γ2 − γ1 ln
γ21
γ22
− 1
ρ2 − ρ1 ln
ρ21
ρ22
. (33)
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Notice that θ1 and θ2 converge to ρ1 and ρ2 (see Section 2) when pi goes to zero. Let
us denote by x∗(µ, σ2) the cost of financial frictions derived in Section 2:
x∗(µ, σ2) =
1
ρ2 − ρ1 ln
ρ21
ρ22
=
σ2
2
√
µ2 + 2rσ2
ln
[√
µ2 + 2rσ2 + µ√
µ2 + 2rσ2 − µ
]
. (34)
We obtain a simple expression of the gains from (costless) hedging:
G0 = x
∗(µ, σ2 + σ2R)− x∗(µ, σ2). (35)
The gains from costless hedging are thus equal to the reduction in the cost of financial
frictions16 obtained by decreasing the squared volatility of the cash generating process
from σ2 + σ2R to σ
2. In Section 7, we use this formula to derive testable implications of
our model on the determinants of corporate hedging.
5 Insurance
We consider in this section a different type of external risk (say a fire or an accident) which
is modelled as a Poisson process: with a probability λdt, the firm incurs a loss m. This
risk can be covered by an insurance contract characterized by a flow premium λ[m+pim2]
where pi represents, here again, a loading factor associated to the remuneration of the
risk taken by the insurer. Denoting by P a Poisson process of intensity λ, the cash flow
dynamics becomes:
dXt = µdt+ σdWt −mdPt, (36)
in the absence of insurance (i = 0), and
dXt = {µ− λ(m+ pim2)}dt+ σdWt, (37)
if the firm buys insurance (i = 1). Assuming that W and P are independent, the associ-
ated operators are:
D(0)V (x) =
σ2
2
V ′′(x) + µV ′(x)− λ[V (x)− V (x−m)]− rV (x), (38)
and:
D(1)V (x) =
σ2
2
V ′′(x) + [µ− λ(m+ pim2)]V ′(x)− rV (x). (39)
Again, the optimal value function is obtained by finding the adapted process (it, Zt)
(where it ∈ {0, 1} represents the insurance decision at date t and Zt is the cumulative
16Recall that this cost is measured by the amount of cash reserves needed before dividends can be
distributed. This is why hedging firms can distribute more dividends.
15
dividend process) that maximizes the expected discounted value of dividends up to liqui-
dation
V¯ (x) = max
i,Z
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtdZt|x0 = x
]
. (40)
As in the case of hedging, we obtain V¯ through a verification theorem whose proof,
similar to that of Theorem 2, is omitted.
Theorem 3 Assume there exist a twice continuously differentiable concave function W
and a constant x1 such that
∀x ≤ x1 max (D(0)W (x), D(1)W (x)) = 0, (41)
∀x ≥ x1 W ′(x) = 1 (42)
together with the initial conditions:
W (0) = 0 and W
′
(0) < +∞ (43)
then W = V¯ . Furthermore, let i∗ the measurable function defined by
i∗(x) = 1 {D(1)W (x)≥D(0)W (x)},
and Lt(x1) the local time at the level x1 of the diffusion process:
dXt = µ− λ(m+ pim2)i∗(Xt))dt+ σdWt −m(1− i∗(Xt))dPt.
Then W (x) = E
∫ τ0
0
e−rsdLs(x1), where
τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt ≤ 0}.
Using the same method as before, we shall construct a solution V¯ to these variational
inequalities that has the same pattern as V0 and V : convex kink at 0, then concave.
Before going further, we point out an interesting result: insurance is never optimal for x
small. Indeed:
D(1)V¯ (x)−D(0)V¯ (x) = λ [V¯ (x)− V¯ (x−m)− (m+ pim2)V¯ ′(x)] .
Since V¯ (x−m) = 0 for x ≤ m and V¯ ′(0) > 0, this expression is negative for x sufficiently
small.
Next section will be devoted to the case of fair insurance, that is pi = 0.
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5.1 Fair Insurance
In the case of fair insurance, we will establish below that the optimal insurance decision
is given by:
i∗(x) = 0 if 0 ≤ x < x¯0 (44)
= 1 if x¯0 ≤ x ≤ x¯1, (45)
where x¯0 and x¯1 are respectively the insurance and the dividend thresholds. Notice that
the relation between cash holdings and insurance decisions is the opposite of the relation
between cash holdings and hedging decisions: the firms that are poor in cash do not buy
insurance but they do hedge. The opposite is true for cash-rich firms.
Like before, the value function V¯ can be obtained by finding a C2 solution to the
following free boundary problem:
D(0)V (x) = 0 0 < x < x¯0
D(1)V (x) = 0 x¯0 < x < x¯1
V (0) = 0, V ′(x1) = 1, V ′′(x¯1) = 0.
We need to introduce some notation. By analogy with Section 3, let us denote by
γ¯1 < 0 < γ¯2 the roots of the characteristic equation corresponding to i = 1 (insurance):
(µ− λm)γ + 1
2
σ2γ2 = r, (46)
and by θ¯1 < 0 < θ¯2 the roots of the characteristic equation corresponding to i = 0 (no
insurance):17
µθ +
1
2
σ2θ2 = r + λ. (47)
We are in a position to give the value of the firm corresponding to the optimal fair
insurance problem.
Theorem 4 Assume that m ≤ µ
r+λ
. The optimal return function V is given by
V¯ (x) =
 A¯(e
θ¯2x − eθ¯1x) for x ≤ x¯0
B¯eγ¯1x + C¯eγ¯2x for x¯0 ≤ x ≤ x¯1
x+ µ−λm
r
− x¯1 for x ≥ x¯1.
where x¯0 and x¯1 are given by
x¯0 =
1
θ¯2 − θ¯1
ln
(
1−mθ¯1
1−mθ¯2
)
. (48)
x¯1 = x¯0 +
1
γ¯2 − γ¯1 ln
(
γ¯21(1−mγ¯2)
γ¯22(1−mγ¯1)
)
. (49)
17This assumes implicitly that x¯0 ≤ m, so that V (x−m) = 0 in the no-insurance region. This will be
checked ex post.
17
Proof: See the appendix.
Let us point out that the optimal fair insurance problem is characterized by three regimes:
• 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯0 (no insurance regime):
V¯ (x) = A¯
[
eθ¯2x − eθ¯1x
]
, (50)
• x¯0 ≤ x ≤ x¯1 (insurance regime):
V¯ (x) = B¯eγ¯1x + C¯eγ¯2x, (51)
• x ≥ x¯1 (dividend payment):
V¯ (x) = x+
µ− λm
r
− x¯1
Theorem 4 shows that fair insurance is bought when the firm is rich (x > x¯0) and the
risks are not too high (m ≤ µ
r+λ
). For completeness, we shall examine the case m ≥ µ
r+λ
.
Next proposition shows that in that case, the shareholders optimally assume the Poisson
risk. The optimal return function has the same form as in the Benchmark case. Hence,
and by contrast with the hedging case (see Proposition 4) large risks are not insured even
if insurance is fair.
Proposition 5 Assume that m ≥ µ
r+λ
, the optimal return function V¯ is given by:
V¯ (x) =
{
A˜(eθ¯2x − eθ¯1x) for x ≤ x˜1
x− x˜1 + µr+λ ,
where
x˜1 =
2
θ¯2 − θ¯1
ln
∣∣∣∣ θ¯1θ¯2
∣∣∣∣ ,
and
A˜(eθ¯2x˜1 − eθ¯1x˜1) = 1.
Proof: See the appendix.
The properties of the value function corresponding to optimal fair insurance are sum-
marized in the following figure:
18
-6Value
of the firm
• •





















− µ
r+λ Cash holdings












VFB(x)
V¯ (x)
x¯1No insurance Dividends
V0(x)
x¯0 Insurance
Figure 5: The gains from insurance: The value V¯ (x)
of the firm that insures optimally compared with
the value V0(x) of the firm that does not insure, and
the first best value VFB(x) = max(0, x+
µ
r+λ
).
Like for hedging, the gains from insurance can be measured by the difference between
the cost of financial frictions without and with insurance.
5.2 Positive loading factor
In the case of a positive loading factor (pi > 0), we do not succeed to characterize the
optimal policy. We will content ourselves to highlight the readers about the complexity
of the study. In particular, the optimal policy for insurance may not exhibit the same
pattern as in the case of fair insurance. As a first result, we will prove below that the
optimal policy i∗(x) must be equal to zero in the neighbourhood of the level of dividend
payment x1 as soon as the loss m is small.
Proposition 6 Assume that pi > 0. For m small enough, there is an open interval
O = (x1 − ε, x1) where the optimal policy i∗ equals zero .
Proof: See the appendix.
As a second result, we will point out that there still exists situations where it is optimal
to insure. Recall that,
D(1)V¯ (x)−D(0)V¯ (x) = λ [V¯ (x)− V¯ (x−m)− (m+ pim2)V¯ ′(x)] .
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Therefore, for x ≤ m, we assume optimally the risk if and only if
ϕ(x) ≡ e
θ¯2x − eθ¯1x
θ¯2eθ¯2x − θ¯1eθ¯1x
. ≤ m(1 + pim).
Note that ϕ is a nondecreasing function with
ϕ(0) = 0, ϕ′(0) = 1, ϕ′′(0) = 2
µ
σ2
.
this is equivalent to ϕ(m) ≤ m(1 + pim).
Conversely, when pi < µ
σ2
, ϕ(m) ∼ m+ µ
σ2
m2, and thus is greater than m(1 + pim) for m
small enough. Thus, it is optimal to buy insurance before hitting the level m. The last
remark aggregates the previous ones. We claim that for pi < µ
σ2
and m small enough the
optimal policy should have four regimes: a non insurance regime in the neightbourhood
of zero, an insurance regime around m and a non insurance regime in the neightbourhood
of the dividend payment threshold and dividend payment.
6 Extensions
6.1 External Financing
So far, we have only considered the extreme case of a firm with no access to external
financing. It is easy to see that introducing such possibilities has a dramatic impact on
the gains from hedging. For example in the absence of financial frictions, the firm could
attain its first best value by essentially transfering all its risk to a competitive bank (i.e.
σdWt, which has a zero NPV) and retaining the deterministic part (i.e. µdt, which has
NPV µ
r
). Then there would be no need for the firm to retain cash and thus no gains from
hedging or insurance.
Of course some form of financial frictions (due for example to imperfect verifiability
of cash flows, moral hazard or agency problems) have to be introduced for hedging and
insurance to become valuable. But then the financial structure and risk management
policies would have to be endogenized simultaneously so as to limit the impact of those
financial frictions. This is outside the scope of this paper. What we do instead is introduce
exogenously two types of external financing:
a) a risky bond that pays a constant coupon flow cdt until the firm goes bust. This is
easily captured by replacing µ by (µ− c) in all our formulas,
b) a credit line that allows the firm to incur an overdraft (i.e. a negative Xt) up to
some limit Xt = −l, where the firm is liquidated.
20
If financial markets are competitive, the best credit line that can be obtained by the
firm is characterized by two features:
• The credit limit l is equal to the liquidation value of the firm’s assets for the bank.
We assume that it is a fraction α of the expected present value µ
r
of future cash
flows. α measures the tangibility of the firm’s assets.
• The interest rate charged on overdrafts is equal to r (the managers pays rXt per
unit of time if Xt becomes negative).
For simplicity, let us discuss the impact of these two financial instruments one after
the other.
Leverage has a relatively straightforward effect, analogous to reduced profitability.
This is because µ is replaced in all our formulas by (µ− c). In order to measure relative
leverage, we use the variable c
µ
, the inverse of the interest coverage ratio. The impact of
c
µ
on hedging is discussed in the next section.
The impact of the credit line is more complex: equation (1) becomes
dXt = (µ− rX−t )dt+ σdWt
and the value function becomes
VCL(x) = sup
Z
E
(∫ T−l
0
e−rs dZs
)
.
where l = αµ
r
and
T−l = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt ≤ −l}.
As before, one can show that VCL is a concave nondecreasing function and there is a
threshold x∗CL above which dividends are distributed. Moreover, VCL is characterized by:{
rVCL = (µ− rx−)V ′CL + 12σ2V ′′CL
VCL(−l) = 0 V ′CL(x∗CL) = 1 V ′′CL(x∗CL) = 0
.
As established in next Proposition, the credit line contract decreases the cost of finan-
cial frictions (and therefore the gains from hedging). To illustrate this we have represented
in Figure 6 the impact of the credit line on the value function in the absence of hedging
(benchmark case). Gains from hedging, measured by the vertical distance to the first
best value function VFB are dramatically reduced, especially if α is large (more tangible
assets).
Proposition 7 The value function VCL is a strictly increasing function of α. Conse-
quently, 0 ≤ x∗CL ≤ x∗ where x∗ is the optimal threshold in the benchmark model.
21
The proof is reported to the Appendix. Note that if we define VCL = Vα to illustrate
the dependence in α, V0 is the value function in the benchmark model and V1 = VFB the
unconstrained value function.
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Figure 6: A credit line reduces the dividend
threshold (and thus the potential gains from hedging
from x∗ to x∗CL). The value function becomes VCL.
To conclude, notice that even if credit line availability changes the extend of hedging,
it does not alter our main, qualitative, findings:
• profitability and leverage have a non monotonic impact on hedging,
• insurance and hedging patterns are opposed.
6.2 Partial Hedging
As a second extension we discuss what happens when we allow the firm to choose a
hedging ratio h in the interval [0, 1]. When hedging is costly, it will be optimal to do so
in our model.18 In fact the optimal hedging pattern will be consistent with our previous
findings (see Figure 3). The main difference is that the value function of the firm is now
18This is consistent with empirical evidence. For example Allayanis and Ofek (2001) examine the
decision to use foreign currency derivatives and the extent of currency hedging. They find that a firm’s
net exchange rate exposure is positively related with foreign sales, and negatively related with foreign
currency derivatives use, which is consistent with a partial coverage of currency risk.
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characterized by the non linear differential equation:{
max
0≤h≤1
L(h)V (x) = 0 for x ≤ x1
V (0) = 0V ′(x1) = 1V ′′(x1) = 0
(52)
with
L(h)V (x) =
1
2
(σ2 + (1− h)2σ2R)V ′′(x) + (µ− h
σ2R
2
pi)V ′(x)− rV (x).
The main task is to construct a concave solution to equation (52). Unfortunately, we
do not achieve this purpose. We content ourselves with providing qualitative results
concerning the optimal hedging policy. Let us define by h∗ the maximizer and assume
the existence of an open interval O such that 0 < h∗(x) < 1. Then,
h∗(x) = 1 +
pi
2
V ′(x)
V ′′(x)
,
and
L(h∗)V (x) = L(1)V (x)− pi
2σ2R
8
(V ′(x))2
V ′′(x)
. (53)
We start our analysis by looking forward assumptions ensuring that h∗(x) = 0. If it is
optimal to assume the risk, the value function is given by the benchmark formula
V (x) = A(eθ2x − eθ1x)
where θ1 < 0 < θ2 are the roots of the equation
1
2
(σ2 + σ2R)θ
2 + µθ = r.
Computing h∗ near 0, we obtain
pi ≥ 4µ
σ2 + σ2R
Therefore, we have
Proposition 8 If pi ≥ 4µ
σ2+σ2R
, it is optimal to assume the risk. Moreover, the value
function is given by the benchmark case with σ2 + σ2R in place of σ
2.
From now, we assume that pi ≤ 4µ
σ2+σ2R
. Our next finding concerns the pattern of the
maximizer h∗. Setting
a =
σ2
2
, b = µ− σ
2
R
2
pi and α =
pi2σ2R
8
,
we can solve implicitly the nonlinear equation (53),
2aV ′′(x) = −bV ′(x) + rV (x)−
√
(bV ′(x)− rV (x))2 + 4aα(V ′(x))2. (54)
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Therefore,
L(h∗)V (0+) = L(1)V (0+) +
α
2a
(b+
√
b2 + 4aα)V ′(0+).
Since V ′ is bounded below by one, we conclude that it is never optimal to totally hedge
its position even in the neightbourhood of zero.
Conversely, we claim that there is a constant x0 < x1 such that h
∗ = 0 on (x0, x1). If not,
putting in the equation (54) the conditions defining V on x1, we obtain
0 = −b+ rV (x1) +
√
(b− rV (x1))2 + 4aα
which yields to a contradiction.
7 Who Should Hedge?
We conclude this paper by deriving from our model several testable implications about
which firms are more likely to hedge,19 in the hope to shed light on the mixed findings
of the empirical literature. We already found in Proposition 3 that, provided a firm has
decided to use hedging instruments optimally, it will tend to buy hedging (h = 1) when
it is cash poor (x ≤ x0) and to self-insure (h = 0) when it is cash rich (x > x0). We now
study the prior decision to create, within the firm, a risk management unit and to hire the
personnel able to manage the hedging position of the firm according to the instructions
given by top management. This decision is optimal if the gains from hedging exceeds the
cost of creating this risk management unit.
Consider now an empirical economist who has collected data on the balance sheets
of a large population of firms, and can therefore estimate the parameters of our model
such as expected profitability µ, volatility of earnings, σ2, leverage (measured here by the
inverse interest coverage ratio c
µ
). Our model predicts that the probability that a firm
has created a risk management unit is an increasing function of the gain from hedging,
measured by the reduction in the costs of financial frictions obtained by hedging. When
the cost of hedging is small (pi ∼ 0) we saw that this gain could be approximated by:
G0 = x
∗(µ, σ2 + σ2R)− x∗(µ, σ2)
when the firm is unleveraged (c = 0). As we have noticed in Section 5, this formula can
be easily extended to the case where c > 0:
G0 = x
∗(µ− c, σ2 + σ2R)− x∗(µ− c, σ2). (55)
19For simplicity, we focus on the hedging decision, since the formulas for the gains from insurance are
more complex.
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We already saw that x∗ is an increasing, concave, function of σ2. Thus we deduce
immediately from formula (55) that:
∂G0
∂σ2R
> 0 and
∂G0
∂σ2
< 0.
This means that the gain from hedging increases with the volatility σ2R of the hedgeable
risk and decreases with the volatility σ2 of the “operating” risk. More interestingly, the
impact of µ and c (or indeed µ− c) is non monotonic, as illustrated by Figure 7:
- -µ c/µ•
c
•
1
6
G0
6
G0
Figure 7: The gain from hedging as a function
of profitability µ and leverage c/µ.
Thus profitability and leverage have a non monotonic (and highly non linear) impact
on the gains from hedging. This may explain why empirical studies who use linear spec-
ifications have failed to derive a significant impact of profitability and leverage on the
likelihood that a firm decides to hedge.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Let us recall that the cost of financial frictions is given by:
x∗(µ, σ2) =
1
ρ2 − ρ1 ln
ρ21
ρ22
=
σ2
2
√
µ2 + 2rσ2
ln
[√
µ2 + 2rσ2 + µ√
µ2 + 2rσ2 − µ
]
.
x∗ is a continuous, positive function of µ satisfying
lim
{µ→0}
x∗(µ, σ2) = lim
{µ→∞}
x∗(µ, σ2) = 0.
A straightforward but tedious calculus gives
∂x∗
∂µ
(µ, σ2) = σ2(µ+ 2rσ2)−
3
2
[
−µArgth
(
µ√
µ+ 2rσ2
)
+
√
µ+ 2rσ2
]
Thus ∂x
∗
∂µ
has the sign of
g(µ) = −µArgth
(
µ√
µ+ 2rσ2
)
+
√
µ+ 2rσ2.
But, g
′
(µ) = −Argth
(
µ√
µ+2rσ2
)
and g(0) =
√
2rσ2 and lim{µ→∞} g(µ) = −∞. Therefore,
f changes sign once and x∗ admits a unique maximum.
Moreover, setting t = µ
σ2
and a = 2r
µ
, we get
x∗(µ, σ2) ≡ f(t) = 1√
t2 + a
Argth
(√
t
t+ a
)
.
We have f
′
(0) = −1 and f ′′(t) = −2Argth
(√
t
t+a
)
. Therefore,
∂x∗
∂σ2
=
∂t
∂σ2
f
′
(t) ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 2: The result is a consequence of the two following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Let W satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 2. Then for any control (ht, Zt),
W (x) ≥ E
(∫ τ0
0
e−rs dZs
)
,
for all x ≥ 0.
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Proof of lemma 1 Fix a policy (ht, Zt) and write the process Zt = Z
c
t +Z
d
t where Z
c
t is
the continuous part of Zt and Z
d
t is the pure discontinuous part of Zt. Let,
dXt = (µ− σ
2
R
2
ht)t+ σdWt + σR(1− ht)dWRt − dZt,
be the evolution of the cash under the policy (ht, Zt) and let us define
τ0 = inf{t ≥, Xt ≤ 0}.
Using the generalized Ito formula (see Dellacherie and Meyer Theorem VIII.27) and the
equality Xs −Xs− = −(Zs − Zs−), we can write
e−r(t∧τ0)W (Xt∧τ0) = W (x) +
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsL(h)W (Xs) ds
+
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsW
′
(Xs) (σdWt + σR(1− ht)dWRt )−
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsW
′
(Xs) dZ
c
s
+
∑
s≤t∧τ0
e−rs(W (Xs)−W (Xs−)),
where
L(h)W (x) =
(
σ2 + σ2R(1− h)2
2
)
W
′′
+ (µ− σ
2
R
2
h)W
′ − rW.
Since W satisfies (21) and (22) the second term of the right hand side is negative. Since
W is concave and increasing, 0 ≤ W ′(Xs) ≤ W ′(0) and thus the third term is a centered
square integrable martingale. Taking expectations, we get
E
(
e−r(t∧τ0)W (Xt∧τ0)
)
= W (x)− E
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsW
′
(Xs) dZ
c
s
+ E
∑
s≤t∧τ0
e−rs(W (Xs)−W (Xs−)).
By concavity and since W
′
(x) ≥ 1, we get W (Xs)−W (Xs−) ≤ −(Zs − Zs−). Therefore,
W (x) ≥ E (e−r(t∧τ0)W (Xt∧τ0))+ E ∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsW
′
(Xs) dZs.
By concavity, W (x) ≤ W ′(0)x and thus
lim inf
t→∞
E
(
e−r(t∧τ0)W (Xt∧τ0)
)
= 0.
We conclude by letting t tend to infinity.
Lemma 2 Let W,h∗ and Lt(x1) be given by Theorem 2. Then,
W (x) = E
(∫ τ0
0
e−rs dLs(x1)
)
.
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Proof of lemma 2 Assume that x ≤ x1. According to slight extension of Proposition
6.16 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991), (Xt, Lt(x1)) is a solution to the following Skorohod
problem: {
Xt ≤ x1∫∞
0
1 {Xs 6=x1}dLs(x1) = 0
Moreover, L(h∗)W (x) = 0 for all x ≤ x1. Applying Ito’s formula in the same manner as
in the proof of lemme 1, we get
E
(
e−r(t∧τ0)W (Xt∧τ0)
)
= W (x)− E
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rsW
′
(Xs) dLs(x1).
Since W
′
(x1) = 1, the Skorohod problem gives
E
(
e−r(t∧τ0)W (Xt∧τ0)
)
= W (x)− E
∫ t∧τ0
0
e−rs dLs(x1).
We conclude by letting t tend to infinity.
Proof of Proposition 3: When it is positive, x0 is characterized by the condition that
the firm is indifferent between hedging or not:
L(1)V (x0)− L(0)V (x0) = −1
2
σ2R [piV
′(x0) + V ′′(x0)] = 0
or
−V
′′(x0)
V ′(x0)
= pi. (A1)
Given the expression of V in the hedging region (formula (28) in Proposition 3), we
deduce:
θ22e
θ2x0 − θ21eθ1x0 = −pi
[
θ2e
θ2x0 − θ1eθ1x0
]
.
Thus
e(θ2−θ1)x0 =
θ1(θ1 + pi)
θ2(θ2 + pi)
,
which implies (30).
V being C2, we can also use the expression of V in the no-hedging region:
V (x) = Beγ1x + Ceγ2x.
The boundary conditions at x1 give the values of B and C:
B =
γ2e
−γ1x1
γ1(γ2 − γ1) , C = −
γ1e
−γ2x1
γ2(γ2 − γ1) .
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Condition (A1) then implies:
−γ1γ2eγ1(x0−x1) + γ1γ2eγ2(x0−x1) = pi
[
γ2e
γ1(x0−x1) − γ1eγ2(x0−x1)
]
.
This gives:
e(γ1−γ2)(x0−x1) =
γ1(γ2 + pi)
γ2(γ1 + pi)
, (A2)
which implies formula (31). We just have to check that the right hand side of (A2) is
positive. This comes from the fact that pi ≤ 2µ
σ2+σ2R
< −γ1.
Proof of Theorem 4: The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 4. By definition,
x¯0 is such that
D(1)V¯ (x¯0) = D(0)V¯ (x¯0), i.e.
V¯ (x¯0)− V¯ (x¯0 −m) = mV¯ ′(x¯0).
When x¯0 < m (which will be checked ex post), V¯ (x¯0 − m) = 0, and the condition
becomes
V¯ (x¯0) = mV¯
′(x0).
Using the expression of V¯ in the no-insurance regime (equation (50)), this gives:
eθ¯2x¯0 − eθ¯1x¯0 = m(1 + pim)
[
θ¯2e
θ¯2x¯0 − θ¯1eθ¯1x¯0
]
,
which implies (48). Similarly we can use the expression of V¯ in the insurance regime
(equation (51)), together with the values of B¯ and C¯ obtained as in the proof of Propo-
sition 3:
B¯ =
γ¯2e
−γ¯1x¯1
γ¯1(γ¯2 − γ¯1) , C¯ = −
γ¯1e
−γ¯2x¯1
γ¯2(γ¯2 − γ¯1) ,
and
B¯eγ¯1x¯0 + C¯eγ¯2x¯0 = m
[
γ¯1B¯e
γ¯1x¯0 + γ¯2C¯e
γ¯2x¯0
]
.
After easy computations, we obtain formula (49). Then we have to check that x¯0 ≤ m
and x¯1 ≥ x¯0. The first condition is equivalent to prove that the function g defined by
g(m) = ln(1−mθ¯1)− ln(1−mθ¯2)−m(θ¯2 − θ¯1).
is nonpositive. But, under the assumption m ≤ µ
r + λ
, it is easy to check that g(0) = 0
and g
′
(m) ≤ 0 for any m ≤ µ
r+λ
. Therefore, g is nonpositive on (0, µ
r+λ
) which is the
desired result.
The second condition is equivalent to
γ¯21(1− γ¯2m) ≥ γ¯22(1− γ¯1m),
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or:
m ≤ γ¯
2
1 − γ¯22
γ¯1γ¯2(γ¯1 − γ¯2) =
γ¯1 + γ¯2
γ¯1γ¯2
=
µ− λm
r
,
that is m ≤ µ
r+λ
.
Finally, we check that V¯ is a concave solution to the variational inequalities (41), (42).
Proof of Proposition 5: Again, it is enough to check that V¯ is a concave solution to
the variational inequalities (41), (42).
For x ≤ x˜1, D(1)V¯ (x) must be nonpositive. But,
D(1)V¯ (x) = A˜λ
(
(1−mθ¯2)eθ¯2x − (1−mθ¯1)eθ¯1x
)
.
If (1 − mθ¯2) ≤ 0 then D(1)V¯ (x) is nonpositive, while if (1 − mθ¯2) ≥ 0 then D(1)V¯ (x)
is a nondecreasing function, nonpositive on the interval [0, 1
θ¯2−θ¯1 ln
(
1−mθ¯1
1−mθ¯2
)
]. Since, the
condition m ≥ µ
r+λ
is equivalent to
2
θ¯2 − θ¯1
ln
∣∣∣∣ θ¯1θ¯2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1θ¯2 − θ¯1 ln
(
1−mθ¯1
1−mθ¯2
)
,
D(1)V¯ (x) is nonpositive on [0, x˜1].
For x ≥ x˜1, we have
D(1)V¯ (x) = −r(x− x˜1)− λ(m− µ
r + λ
) ≤ 0,
and
D(0)V¯ (x) = −r(x− x˜1)− λ(V¯ (x)− V¯ (x−m)− µ
r + λ
).
Concavity of V¯ yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 6: Using the equality,
D(1)V¯ (x)−D(0)V¯ (x) = λ [V¯ (x)− V¯ (x−m)− (m+ pim2)V¯ ′(x)] ,
we give an expansion of V (x−m) around x to obtain
D(1)V¯ (x)−D(0)V¯ (x) =
[
−piV¯ ′(x)− 1
2
V¯ ′′(x)
]
m2 + o(m2).
Remembering that V¯ ′(x1) = 1 and V¯ ′′(x1) = 0, we have
D(1)V¯ (x1)−D(0)V¯ (x1) = −pim2 + o(m2) < 0.
The conclusion follows from the continuity of the function D(1)V¯ (x)−D(0)V¯ (x)
Proof of Proposition 7 Take α1 ≤ α2, and define the associated liquidation thresholds
li, i = 1, 2 and hitting times T−li , i = 1, 2. We want to show that Vα1 ≤ Vα2 . There is
30
nothing to prove for x ≤ −l1. For x ≥ −l1, we have T−l1 ≤ T−l2 almost surely. Therefore,
let us consider the dividend policy,
Zˆt = L
x∗1
t if t ≤ T−l1 ,
and
Zˆt = L
x∗2
t if T−l1 ≤ t ≤ T−l2 ,
we obtain
Vα2(x) ≥ E
(∫ T−l2
0
e−rs dZˆs
)
= E
(∫ T−l1
0
e−rsdLx
∗
1
s + e
−rT−l1Vα2(−l1)
)
= Vα1(x) + Vα2(−l1)E(e−rT−l1 ).
Since Vα2 is a strictly increasing function with Vα2(−l2) = 0, we have Vα2(−l1) > 0 which
implies the desired result.
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